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Abstract 
 This article compares the process and outcomes of collective negotiations over the 
outsourcing of call centre jobs in US and German telecommunications firms. In the USA, the 
Communication Workers of America relied on coalitions with politicians and other organizations 
to lead successful public campaigns; while in Germany, ver.di used coordinated bargaining with 
works councils to leverage their strong codetermination rights. Variation in access to resources 
between countries helps explain differences in the unions’ ability to negotiate strong collective 
agreements on outsourcing and to influence restructuring decisions. 
 
Keywords: Call centres, Germany, outsourcing, telecommunications, trade unions, USA, works 
councils 
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Introduction: National Institutions and Local Bargaining Power 
 The growing popularity of outsourcing is of particular concern to trade unions, which 
often lose members and influence as firms move jobs out of core workplaces. However, few 
studies have examined the causes of unions’ varying success in engaging with management over 
outsourcing decisions (for exceptions, see Hayakawa and Simard, 2001; Pulignano, 2005). 
Worker representatives typically lack clear bargaining rights over restructuring measures such as 
outsourcing (Doellgast and Greer, 2007). Union members also often have ambiguous views 
towards outsourcing, as it may be part of a ‘core-periphery’ strategy that preserves the high pay 
and privileges of the in-house workforce. Thus negotiations require considerable communication 
between the local and national union or between works councils and unions to build alternative 
forms of bargaining power and support for a set of shared goals. 
 This study compares union influence on the outsourcing of call centre work, using 
matched pair case studies of six US and German telecommunications firms. It has two goals: to 
examine the dynamics of collective negotiations over outsourcing in different national settings; 
and to analyse the factors that explain company-level variation in the outcomes of those 
negotiations. Industrial relations scholars have debated whether the institutions that influence 
bargaining outcomes are primarily national or increasingly heterogeneous at the regional or firm 
level (e.g. Locke, 1992). Today it is widely recognized that unions in both liberal and social 
market countries rely on a variety of resources to build bargaining power at a time of declining 
union density and influence (Frege and Kelly, 2003). The notion of a coherent national industrial 
relations system has been undermined by the growing prevalence of company-level bargaining 
and flight of employers from peak-level associations (Katz and Darbishire, 2000; Marginson et 
al., 2003), which has been particularly severe in Germany (Hassel, 1999). Under these 
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conditions, do national institutions still matter for the kinds of tactics and resources unions use to 
influence local bargaining outcomes? 
 I argue here that the resources at the sub-national level that are critical for building 
bargaining power in negotiations over restructuring vary between countries, reflecting 
differences in bargaining structures and bargaining rights. In Germany, internal coordination 
between different worker representatives through coordinated bargaining between unions and 
works councils has long been viewed as the key to union strength (Thelen, 1991). Today, unions’ 
ability to maintain or build these relationships with works councils and the workforce is 
diminishing, but remains crucial for extending their influence to new sectors and groups of 
workers across supply chains. Local unions in the USA also benefit from information-sharing 
and strategy development with the national union (Frost, 2000), but have fewer options to 
institutionalize these relationships and leverage them in negotiations. This lack of strong 
institutional supports means that external coalitions and member mobilization are more 
important for building countervailing power. 
 In the following sections, I describe the cases and outcome variables; discuss recent 
changes in markets and industrial relations institutions that have encouraged firms to outsource 
call centre work; and then analyse variation in union influence over outsourcing. Findings are 
based on over 200 interviews conducted between 2003 and 2005 with corporate and local 
managers, works councillors and union representatives, as well as on collective agreements and 
archival materials. 
Case Studies 
 The US cases – Verizon Communications East (formerly NYNEX and Bell Atlantic), 
BellSouth, and AT&T – are three of the largest competitors in the landline segment of the 
industry, providing local, long-distance and broadband services. All grew out of the former 
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monopoly known as the ‘Bell System’. NYNEX, Bell Atlantic, and BellSouth were Regional 
Bell Operating Companies (RBOCs), or ‘Baby Bells’, that were divested from AT&T, or ‘Ma 
Bell’, following a court order in 1984. All companies have a long tradition of collective 
bargaining with the Communication Workers of America (CWA), which since divestiture has 
remained the dominant union in the industry.  
 The German cases – T-Com, T-Mobile, and T-Online – were three separate business 
units of Deutsche Telekom (DT), the former German monopoly provider, at the time of this 
study. In 2005, T-Online was brought back into the parent company to take advantage of 
growing synergies between Internet and voice services. However, in 2003 each still serviced 
different market segments and owned separate networks of call centres. T-Com was the core 
business unit focusing on local landline and long distance, T-Mobile was responsible for the 
company’s wireless network and services, and T-Online focused on Internet services. All three 
had strong works councils that negotiated collective agreements and elected representatives to 
DT’s group works council. T-Com and T-Mobile also negotiated company agreements with the 
service union ver.di, while T-Online never concluded an agreement with ver.di.  
 In order to analyse variation in negotiations over outsourcing between incumbent firms, it 
was necessary to accommodate the different structure and history of the incumbent firms in each 
country. I use two measures of union ‘success’ to compare outcomes across cases. First, 
agreements that either bring union-represented jobs in-house or restrict the outsourcing of these 
jobs are typically advantageous from the union’s perspective, as they can increase both the pool 
of potential union members and workers’ job security while limiting management’s ability to use 
the threat of outsourcing to gain concessions. The extent to which unions make concessions on 
pay and working conditions in exchange for these agreements indicates whether limits on 
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outsourcing are secured using bargaining power or simply traded for job security. Second, the 
number and kinds of jobs outsourced provides a measure of the impact of these agreements on 
outsourcing strategies. 
Changing Markets and Industrial Relations in Telecommunications 
 Until the late 1990s, DT retained its monopoly in fixed line services, but competitive 
conditions have since become increasingly similar in the two countries. In the USA, the 1996 
Telecommunications Act opened up competition in the local telephone market while 1998 
legislation in Germany ended DT’s monopolies for network infrastructure and fixed-line voice 
telephony. At the same time, firms in new, less regulated segments such as mobile phones and 
cable began competing for market share in Internet services and local and long-distance calls.  
 These changes in markets have contributed to the growing fragmentation of collective 
bargaining in both countries. In the USA, the CWA and International Brotherhood of Electrical 
Workers (IBEW) continued to represent workers at the regional Bells and AT&T following 
divestiture in 1984. However, national bargaining was soon eliminated, and today bargaining 
occurs at company, business unit or regional level, depending on the topic and the geographical 
scope of the company (Keefe and Batt, 1997). In Germany, the Deutche Postgewerkschaft (DPG) 
negotiated a series of company agreements with DT and its subsidiaries, but no employers’ 
association has been established to negotiate sectorally (Sako and Jackson, 2006). In 2001, the 
DPG merged with four other service unions to form ver.di, which currently has formal 
responsibility for representing workers in the industry. However, new competitor firms have 
either negotiated company agreements with other unions such as IG Metall or remained non-
union.  
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 As price competition grew and the non-union sector expanded in both countries, 
incumbent firms began looking for ways to cut labour costs and improve flexibility, with service 
and sales jobs a central focus. Reduced long-distance costs and new call distribution technologies 
made it easier to shift jobs to remote call centres or outsource work to third party vendors – most 
of which had no or weak collective bargaining institutions. The major telecommunications 
unions in both countries sought to influence these decisions, but with variable success. 
United States: Regional Bells and AT&T 
 The CWA has consistently opposed outsourcing, viewing it as a threat to members’ jobs 
and its own bargaining power. However, the union enjoyed strong leverage over outsourcing at 
Verizon, moderate success at BellSouth, and failed in negotiations with AT&T. In all firms, the 
union encountered different challenges for three areas of call centre work: traditional customer 
service and sales work, operator services and directory enquiries, and new work, such as 
outbound sales and technical support. 
Verizon East 
 Traditional customer service and sales jobs are often difficult to outsource because of 
their complexity and strategic importance for winning and retaining customers. However, 
telecommunications firms have attempted to outsource peaks in call volume or ‘hive off’ lower-
skilled tasks to send to third party firms. The CWA has negotiated the strongest contractual 
limits to moving these jobs at Verizon East, prohibiting outsourcing that would involve layoffs 
or part-time work and the permanent transfer of more than 0.7 percent of CWA-represented jobs 
from the county or state where it is currently performed. In addition, the union negotiated rules in 
New York and New England that prevented consolidation of call centres across ‘Interdepartment 
Transfer Areas’. In New York, the company could not close down locations if employees would 
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have to commute more than 35 miles from their original work location. The CWA won an 
arbitration case prior to 2003 bargaining, forcing Verizon to reinstate over 2000 employees 
whose jobs had been cut. 
 Local contracts in the former NYNEX and Bell Atlantic regions also prohibited the 
subcontracting of certain jobs, like telemarketing or inbound calls. In the mid-1990s, Bell 
Atlantic formed a non-union subsidiary called Bell Atlantic Plus and began moving some of its 
core customer service and sales work to the new company at lower pay. In 1998 bargaining, the 
CWA made this a key issue, and during the ensuing strike the union used a public campaign that 
highlighted poor customer service at the new subsidiary. Bell Atlantic eventually agreed to bring 
all of the work in-house and to limit future subcontracting (Katz et al., 2003). US 
telecommunications companies downsized operator services in the 1990s and established 
separate directory enquiries centres, which managers often argued were ‘new work’ and thus not 
covered by the contract. Verizon East was the only company where the CWA has succeeded in 
both keeping this work in-house and avoiding steep pay concessions. Operators were moved into 
directory enquiries jobs, and pay remained at between $10 and $20 an hour.  
 Other new categories of work, including service and sales for new products, technical 
support and telemarketing, were not covered by contracts at any of the companies, and thus have 
been most vulnerable to outsourcing. The CWA was successful in in-sourcing a number of these 
jobs at Verizon. When Verizon East first started selling DSL high speed Internet services, it 
outsourced inbound sales. The CWA led a successful campaign to bring this work back in-house, 
arguing that because it was bundled with traditional phone services it fell under ‘protected’ work 
in their contract. In New England, the CWA set up a formal partnership with Verizon 
management in 2003 to reduce absenteeism and improve productivity in the call centres. 
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Committees of local managers and stewards were established, and federal mediators began 
facilitating regular meetings. After the partnership proved successful in reducing costs, managers 
agreed to in-source DSL campaign and billing work. As a result, the company’s New England 
customer service and sales centres hired over 200 new representatives between 2004 and 2005, 
despite losing customers in the region.  
 Strong agreements limiting outsourcing also gave Verizon incentives to find creative 
ways of using its higher-cost, difficult-to-downsize eastern workforce. For example, as call 
volumes dropped across New York, local call centres had a surplus of employees, and local 
managers succeeded in getting some inbound campaign work brought in-house. The union has 
not been able to halt outsourcing entirely: for example, it was not able to secure an agreement to 
in-source some 5000 technical support jobs for DSL Internet services, which Verizon continues 
to outsource to US and offshore locations. However, union representatives were optimistic that 
they would be able to negotiate an agreement to bring these jobs in-house. 
BellSouth 
 The CWA had more limited success at BellSouth, and was forced to make more 
substantial concessions to keep work in-house. As at Verizon, the contracts prohibited 
outsourcing if it would involve layoffs or part-time work. However, they did not restrict moving 
work between locations, which allowed management to consolidate call centres. A small number 
of jobs that were viewed as less desirable, such as final collections, were outsourced with little 
resistance from the CWA. The CWA made more substantial concessions to keep directory 
enquiries in-house. BellSouth management informed the union in 1997 that it was planning to 
outsource this work, in anticipation of intensified competition in local services.  
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 The CWA agreed to an alternative plan: the company created a new subsidiary to serve 
BellSouth and other clients, and negotiated a new contract with fewer benefits and pay at roughly 
half the in-house rate. At the same time, it was also the only contract with BellSouth that 
prohibited contracting out of work, and the CWA obtained an agreement that BellSouth would 
not transfer any operator work that had been performed in-house to the new company. According 
to one CWA representative, the union was faced with ‘lose it all or try to build a new bargaining 
unit’.  
 The CWA has had similarly mixed results with the outsourcing of ‘new work’. In the 
early 2000s, the company started to outsource its online customer support, but the union was able 
to use political pressure to convince management to perform the work in-house. Now 125 ‘web 
reps’ handle these jobs in a separate call centre, under the traditional customer service contract. 
In 2004 bargaining, the company signed a letter of agreement with the CWA to work together to 
move other ‘jobs of the future’ – such as Voiceover Internet Protocol, wireless Internet, and 
video sales and support – into the bargaining unit. However, union representatives remained 
sceptical whether management would follow through on this pledge, and had not yet begun 
negotiations on pay or working conditions for the new jobs. BellSouth also outsourced all 
telemarketing work in 1998 and some outbound collections work in 2000. 
AT&T 
 The CWA has had the least success at AT&T. Managers circumvented contract 
provisions prohibiting outsourcing by moving core customer service and sales work outside the 
‘Geographic Service Area’ of 35 miles. Before 1997, AT&T routed ‘low value’ customers, with 
bills of under $50 a month, to a vendor, while the higher-value customers were still serviced by 
the in-house workforce. Then in the late 1990s, AT&T began to outsource and offshore most 
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remaining long-distance work, keeping several domestic call centres open as benchmarks for 
vendor performance. By 2004, AT&T was outsourcing 45 percent of its calls, including two-
thirds of its long-distance calls. Between January 1999 and December 2003, the number of in-
house customer service employees dropped from 7500 to 3300, while the number at 
subcontractors employed on AT&T’s accounts grew from 830 to around 3500.  
 In 2001, the CWA initiated a partnership with AT&T to develop a joint plan to in-source 
this work, using leverage over the regulatory approval that the company needed to divest its 
wireless, broadband and manufacturing equipment. AT&T provided detailed information on its 
outsourcing activities and data on the cost difference between the in-house and outsourced 
workforce, which it estimated at around 40 percent. After recalculating to reflect higher quality, 
productivity and sales at union centres, the CWA narrowed the cost difference to 15 percent for 
domestic outsourcing and 30 percent for outsourcing to India. The CWA and AT&T also formed 
a joint committee to address absenteeism at in-house call centres, which resulted in a pilot 
project to introduce job rotation and flexible scheduling. The union demonstrated positive effects 
on morale, and management agreed to extend the pilot.  
 These various initiatives were cut short in 2004 when AT&T decided to pull out of the 
residential long distance market following a regulatory change. AT&T subsequently closed 
several of its own domestic call centres, leading to a loss of around 550 union jobs, and cut a 
thousand vendor jobs. AT&T also unilaterally outsourced directory enquiries work, moving all 
new calls to several vendors in the early 1990s. In 1997, managers approached the CWA to 
discuss bringing some of this work in-house, and eventually created a separate group of 
operators at a lower pay scale, starting at $6.30 an hour at a time when other operators in the 
company were making over $20 an hour. However, AT&T was unable to create sustained 
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demand for the new service, and in 2004 it closed the centres and laid off the last of their 
dwindling workforce. AT&T was also the first of CWA’s employers to outsource outbound 
telemarketing work on a large scale. Following divestiture, AT&T moved all telemarketing calls 
to its nonunion subsidiary Transtech, with hourly wages at roughly half the equivalent pay for 
union members. The CWA attempted to organize Transtech in the early to mid-1990s, but was 
unsuccessful. 
Comparison 
 Table 2 compares contractual protections against outsourcing work and outsourcing 
strategies. Verizon East had the strongest agreements and least extensive outsourcing, AT&T had 
the weakest agreements and most extensive outsourcing, while BellSouth had mixed outcomes.  
 What explains the differences between these three cases? Competitive pressures varied: 
AT&T came under earlier pressure to cut costs when the long-distance market was liberalized in 
the late 1980s. However, Verizon East and BellSouth also faced growing price competition from 
the late 1990s, and still kept more core customer service and sales work in-house than AT&T. In 
addition, the CWA was able to prevent directory enquiries and ‘new work’ from being 
outsourced under strong agreements at Verizon but had more mixed outcomes at BellSouth, 
although both companies enjoyed stable regional monopolies.  
 A second difference may be in employer strategies. AT&T adopted a cost-cutting 
strategy earlier than the two ‘baby Bells’, in response to intense price competition in the long-
distance segment. This encouraged management to outsource aggressively while Verizon and 
BellSouth continued to view their in-house call centre workforce as a key asset for building sales 
in new segments. However, two pieces of evidence suggest that outcomes are not solely or 
primarily driven by these differing strategies. First, interviews with managers at both Verizon 
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and BellSouth made it clear that they would prefer to increase their use of outsourcing or 
offshoring to cut costs, but were explicitly limited from doing so by their union contracts and the 
threat of negative publicity from union-led campaigns. Second, at all three firms, management 
had adopted similar outsourcing strategies, such as setting up non-union subsidiaries or 
subcontracting lower-skilled jobs; but only reversed these strategies following union pressure at 
Verizon (and to a lesser extent at BellSouth). 
 The case studies suggest that variation in agreements on outsourcing and actual company 
practices were strongly influenced by the CWA’s success in building bargaining power at 
company level, using the resources of external coalitions and member mobilization. Before 
divestiture, the CWA played an important role in lobbying state Public Service Commissions 
(PSCs) on behalf of employer applications for rate increases. The union learned to leverage this 
support, together with joint campaigns with other unions, community groups, and local 
politicians, in exchange for favourable agreements with the regional Bells. These coalition 
strategies in turn relied on the union’s ability to show strong internal solidarity through strikes 
and other forms of direct action.  
 The CWA could best combine these resources at Verizon East because of strong 
membership density, location in states with strong labour laws, a tradition of local militancy and 
a legacy of strong collective agreements secured through several successful campaigns in the 
1980s and 1990s. 
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 During a 17-week strike in 1989 against reductions in health care provision the union also 
adopted a new set of strategies that combined political lobbying and coalitions with community 
groups to bolster its position at the bargaining table, working with the IBEW for the first time to 
coordinate a campaign of public petitions, rallies and pickets. For the first time it opposed a rate 
increase that NYNEX had requested from the PSC; and CWA representatives used their personal 
connections with New York’s democratic Governor, Mario Cuomo, to build additional pressure. 
This resulted in a largely successful settlement, when broader concessions were made in other 
former Bell companies. 
 The CWA later used a similar approach when it publicly supported the merger between 
NYNEX and Bell Atlantic in 1998 in exchange for a series of agreements that would become 
important for preventing or reversing outsourcing. In addition, the union coordinated a campaign 
in 1998 that embarrassed Bell Atlantic into bringing core work from its non-union call centre 
subsidiary back in-house. This relied on strikes and public advertisements highlighting poor 
customer service, both of which were supported by a well-organized membership base. 
 At BellSouth and AT&T, the CWA sought to use similar tactics, but was less successful. 
BellSouth was based in ‘right-to-work’ states where the CWA could not apply a closed shop, 
which made it more difficult to organize members and to mount prolonged strikes. The union 
also enjoyed less political support in these regions. In contrast to the Bells, AT&T was a national 
company, and so had broader scope for moving work to regions with cheaper labour costs and 
looser regulations. AT&T was also regulated by the Federal Communications Commission 
(FCC) rather than state PSCs, which made it more difficult to use state-level lobbying (Batt and 
Darbishire, 1997). To compensate for this weaker position, the CWA relied more heavily on 
partnership agreements at the two companies, without the kind of backing from a militant 
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membership and external coalitions enjoyed at Verizon East. However, these were discontinued 
following unpopular restructuring measures in the late 1990s and early 2000s (including 
outsourcing) that were imposed unilaterally by management. 
Germany: Deutsche Telekom 
 At DT’s three core business units – T-Com, T-Mobile, and T-Online – the DPG (later 
ver.di) and the works councils initially viewed outsourcing as a compromise that allowed 
management to cut costs while protecting members’ working conditions. However, they began to 
oppose outsourcing as market growth slowed, as benchmarking with subcontractors increased, 
and as management began to push more aggressively for layoffs. As in the USA, the union’s 
success in negotiations over outsourcing varied across firms, with strong agreements at T-Com, 
mixed outcomes at T-Mobile and general failure at T-Online. Because there has been less 
segmentation of call centre work in Germany compared to the USA, I focus here on strategies 
toward core customer service and sales work and lower-skilled jobs such as directory enquiries 
and telemarketing. 
T-Com 
 DT’s landline division, T-Com, faced growing price competition and a declining 
customer base in the late 1990s, as in AT&T and the regional Bells. However, management did 
not outsource its core customer service and sales jobs. This was due in part to the complexity and 
strategic importance attached to this work (Matuschek et al., 2007), but was also influenced by 
strong collectively negotiated constraints, including Standortsicherungsverträge (location 
security agreements) and job security protections. As a former public company, T-Com retained 
a number of Beamten (civil servants) who enjoy lifetime job security. The DPG also succeeded 
in maintaining and extending job security agreements that prevented involuntary layoffs.   
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 The difficulties this posed for reducing employment shaped subsequent organizational 
strategies. Between 1995 and 2004, DT cut 110,000 positions in its core operations, largely 
through early retirement, voluntary redundancy and natural turnover. Redundant employees who 
did not accept these options were moved into a ‘temporary employment and qualification 
company’, or Beschäftigungsgesellschaft, set up in 2002, which placed employees on short-term 
assignments both within and outside the company. These arrangements were expensive, and 
management began to put pressure on union and works council representatives to cooperate with 
cost-cutting measures (Holtgrewe, 2006). In 1998, the DPG agreed to allow management to shift 
directory enquiries jobs to a vendor in exchange for pay increases for the in-house workforce. T-
Com outsourced 2800 of its 3500 directory enquiries jobs, and surplus employees were moved to 
new jobs in T-Com or in DT’s other subsidiaries. The company also reorganized special 
campaign work, remaining directory enquiries work and late night work into a subsidiary and 
outsourced some outbound telemarketing work to third-party vendors.  
 By 2003, DT’s internal temporary placement agency had close to 20,000 employees, 
entitled to their former rates of pay even if managers were unable to find work for them. In 
January 2004, DT set up a new call centre subsidiary to provide employment for these workers 
called Vivento Customer Services (VCS), to handle the corporate group’s lower-skilled service 
and sales work, allow the company to in-source directory enquiries jobs, and eventually compete 
in the call centre vendor market. 
 In 2003, DT announced future cuts of up to 40,000 jobs and made it clear that without 
concessions, management would not extend job security agreements. In March 2004, ver.di 
concluded an employment pact with the company that reduced working time from 38 to 34 hours 
with only partial wage compensation. In return, job security protections were extended until the 
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end of 2008. Ver.di was also able to keep VCS under the DT collective agreement with 
guaranteed job security but with a 8.75 percent reduction in pay.  
 Ver.di saw the creation of VCS as a positive development that would allow the company 
to take back thousands of jobs that had been outsourced to vendors under a strong collective 
agreement. With a planned expansion to over 5000 employees, it would be the largest call centre 
vendor in Germany. This represented a shift in ver.di’s position, since union officials came to 
view outsourcing as a threat to their members and their organization as managers started 
benchmarking costs against vendors. Works councils were more divided, as they feared that 
more work would be moved from T-Com’s call centres to VCS. Ver.di and the T-Com works 
councils were thus cautiously cooperating with the new VCS plan, helping DT to find new 
markets for the workforce while keeping the pressure on management to keep ‘core’ work in the 
company’s sales and service centres. 
T-Mobile 
 In contrast to T-Com, T-Mobile enjoyed stable growth in call volume and employment 
throughout the 1990s as the wireless market expanded. This allowed the company to increase its 
use of subcontractors for core service and sales calls without threatening the jobs of its in-house 
workforce. T-Mobile built up its call centres and brought in surplus employees from T-Com, 
while simultaneously outsourcing peaks in call volume, vacations, night shifts, and outbound 
campaigns to provide additional flexibility and benchmark agent performance.  
 Works councils at T-Mobile originally saw outsourcing as a complementary strategy to 
improving job security and avoiding unsocial working times. By the late 1990s, however, growth 
in the market had slowed and several alternative network providers had expanded their market 
share. In early 2000, T-Mobile closed one of its call centres and began subcontracting a larger 
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proportion of its core work. As a result, job security and outsourcing became central issues in the 
2002–03 bargaining round. Management wanted to outsource more work while the union and 
works councils were strongly opposed. After difficult negotiations, T-Mobile agreed that no 
locations would be closed until 2008 but that additional call volume could be subcontracted out 
as long as no jobs were lost. In return, the works councils approved a more flexible working time 
model that they had previously opposed and ver.di agreed to a 1 percent pay rise instead of the 
2.1 percent it had demanded. They also agreed that calls during ‘unsocial’ hours – when 
employees had been entitled to overtime pay – could be outsourced to cheaper providers. 
T-Online 
 T-Online was the only subsidiary without a union-negotiated collective agreement, 
although it did have works agreements negotiated by the company’s strong works councils. T-
Online took over call centre locations from T-Com as the online business expanded, allowing 
some continuity in works council leadership. In the late 1990s, the company first began focusing 
on customer service in response to rising call volume and complaints, and in a few years grew to 
five locations with between 300 to 350 employees in each. 
 Then in 2002, T-Online sold three of these locations to different call centre vendors. The 
company retained two locations in Kiel and Oldenburg, which today handle mostly second-level 
technical support. Managers kept around 10 percent of first-level technical support inhouse to 
benchmark vendor performance, but subcontracted out the other 90 percent. Ver.di and the 
central works council went through four rounds of negotiations, and eventually secured an 
agreement that pay and working conditions would remain the same for 18 months after the new 
companies took over, along with full job security and extension of previous agreements with the 
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works councils. After this time, the new companies were free to renegotiate their employment 
contracts or to move the calls to their other locations.  
 The decision to outsource these jobs increased pressure on the in-house workforce to 
agree to concessions, given the growing difference in pay and working conditions between in-
house and outsourced call centres. For example, the T-Online works council negotiated strong 
agreements protecting its call centre employees from silent monitoring and individual evaluation. 
However, some works councillors considered relaxing these rules to improve their 
‘competitiveness’, following a successful pilot at the company’s vendors of a new monitoring 
programme that allowed supervisors to collect and analyse detailed data on individual agent 
performance. One works councillor described being verbally attacked by employees at the 
annual meeting for not giving in to employer demands and thus threatening their jobs.  
 A new round of negotiations with ver.di followed DT’s decision to bring T-Online into 
the parent company in 2005. The original agreement between T-Online and DT laying out the 
conditions of the merger included a plan to outsource the Kiel and Oldenburg locations, but 
ver.di won an agreement to integrate all locations and employees into T-Com. Managers also 
agreed to a 38 hour week across T-Online, and were not able to lay off employees or close 
locations until a new collective agreement was negotiated under T-Com. At the same time, most 
of the company’s online work would continue to be outsourced. 
Comparison 
 Table 3 compares collective agreements on outsourcing and outsourcing strategies in the 
German cases. T-Com had the most favourable outcomes, T-Mobile traded limits against larger 
concessions on pay and working conditions, while T-Online had no formal agreements and 
outsourced the majority of call centre jobs. 
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 What explains the variation across the three companies? Again, competitive pressures 
differed. T-Mobile and T-Online expanded employment in the 1990s in response to market 
growth, and thus works councillors were more willing to accept some outsourcing of core work; 
while T-Com’s works councillors opposed restructuring measures that could lead to job cuts at a 
time when their company was downsizing. However, these differences explain the strength of 
union resistance rather than differences in external pressures on employers – if anything, T-Com 
had more of an incentive to outsource work than the mobile and online subsidiaries, as it faced 
the most intense price competition (like AT&T). In addition, cost cutting pressures and worker 
attitudes towards outsourcing have become more similar in the three firms as competition 
increased and market growth slowed across the sectors.  
 Employer strategies may also help to explain variation in outcomes. T-Com management 
has more continuity from the old Bundespost and still values close relationships with worker 
representatives. T-Online’s managers were more often recruited externally and developed a 
reputation for independence from the parent company, which may explain both their aggressive 
approach towards outsourcing and their resistance to negotiating a collective agreement. 
However, as with the US cases, managers at T-Com and T-Mobile made it clear in interviews 
and through their actions that they did not feel free to pursue a unilateral strategy of outsourcing, 
despite the attractiveness in terms of cost savings and flexibility.  
 As in the USA, variation across the companies in the union’s bargaining power provides 
an important explanation for these differences. However, while the CWA relied on strong 
external coalitions, ver.di depended on access to strong coordinated bargaining structures at 
company level, again supported by its ability to mobilize a well-organized base of union 
members. 
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 After DT adopted a divisional structure in the late 1990s, T-Com was the only major 
division that remained legally within the parent company. This meant that there was continuity in 
employment and bargaining structures from the old public monopoly. Membership density 
remained close to 70 percent, and around 30 percent of employees were Beamten with lifetime 
job security. When T-Mobile and T-Online were established as separate subsidiaries, managers 
sought to recruit a younger, more flexible workforce. Employees had the option to move from T-
Com to the subsidiaries, typically with higher pay, but were required to take temporary leave 
from their Beamte status, which they would then lose after five years if they did not transfer 
back. Younger employees were more likely to take this option. Both these transferred employees 
and new hires lacked the strong historical ties to the DPG found in T-Com, and union density 
was lower, at around 15 percent at T-Mobile and 5 percent at T-Online. While most works 
councillors at the three companies were ver.di members, communication with their colleagues at 
other locations or with the union remained strongest at T-Com, was being strengthened at T-
Mobile, but was still quite weak at T-Online.  
 This difference in the history and structure of bargaining influenced the level of 
information exchange and coordinated strategy development between worker representatives. At 
T-Com, considerable consultation occurred at different levels. Union and works council 
members on the supervisory board were informed about organizational restructuring decisions 
well in advance, and in some cases, special committees provided an additional forum for 
consultation over issues that unions and works councils viewed as strategically important. For 
example, a joint Innovation and Employment Advisory Committee (Innovations- und 
Beschäftigungsbeirat) was established in the late 1990s. T-Com managers felt that they could not 
implement major restructuring decisions without consulting the union, and every month a 
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permanent board of company representatives informed works council representatives about re-
engineering plans. This bargaining power, combined with the strong job security protections that 
were a legacy of the company’s public sector history, meant that ver.di was able to negotiate an 
agreement to in-source directory enquiries with only marginal pay concessions, while extending 
job security protections.  
 At T-Mobile, works councillors felt that ver.di played an important role in negotiating 
collective agreements and supporting the works councils, but noted that they were not in frequent 
contact with the union and received more support from the central works council. Worker 
representatives at all three companies agreed that the union was considerably weaker in the 
subsidiaries, which made it more difficult to convince works councils to take a solidaristic 
position on outsourcing across locations. Several T-Mobile works councillors said that while 
they supported ver.di, they did not see it as their job to convince workers to become members.  
 As at T-Com, T-Mobile union and works council representatives also pointed to 
coordinated bargaining as the key to their success in getting a collective agreement in 2003 that 
improved job security protections and limited future outsourcing. At the same time, the works 
councils made substantial concessions in working time flexibility and the union settled on a 
small overall pay increase to secure this agreement.  
 At T-Online, this kind of coordinated campaign was not possible during negotiations over 
the 2002 decision to outsource three call centres to thirdparty vendors. Ver.di did not yet have a 
collective agreement with T-Online and played only a marginal role in working with the works 
councils to develop a coordinated strategy. This exacerbated the problem of competition across 
locations for jobs, which was manifest in the lack of solidarity among T-Online’s works councils 
at the time of negotiations over outsourcing. Works councils at locations that remained in the 
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company did not oppose the decision, as they had secured job security agreements for their own 
members. 
 Since the conclusion of my research, outsourcing has become an even more contentious 
and public issue at DT. In 2006, it transferred five of the 19 call centres in its Vivento CS 
subsidiary, with around 700 employees, to two subcontractors. Employees’ pay and working 
conditions were secured until 2008, but after that time the new employers will presumably 
renegotiate contracts at a lower level. In 2006, ver.di also agreed to reduced starting pay for new 
hires in T-Mobile’s call centres. This followed an emotional campaign in which management 
threatened to sell its call centres to a vendor if its terms were not accepted.  
 Then in 2007 DT announced plans to shift 50,000 of its technical service, technical 
infrastructure, and call centre jobs into three new subsidiaries, and demanded the renegotiation of 
pay and working conditions in these subsidiaries. Although ver.di led a six week strike with 
strong support from its membership, both parties eventually agreed to reduce wage levels for 
current employees by 6.5 percent over 42 months and increase working time from 34 to 38 
weeks without pay compensation. In addition, new employees will earn 30 percent below the 
current level, the use of variable pay will increase, and the regular working week in call centres 
will include Saturdays. Management agreed to extend job security until 2012 and to not sell the 
new service subsidiaries until 2010. An important factor in ver.di’s decision to return to 
negotiations was management’s threat to transfer employees to the new companies without a 
collective agreement. This will have further negative implications for the coordination of 
bargaining within DT, as works councils will be obliged to develop a new structure for decision-
making at each business unit and across the corporation. 
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 These recent developments suggest that the decentralization of collective bargaining, 
growth of a non-union sector, and increased price competition in the German 
telecommunications industry are further weakening ver.di’s ability to rely on its traditional forms 
of bargaining power – even in the company’s traditional ‘core’ business. The result will be 
growing convergence in employment conditions and outsourcing strategies across DT’s business 
units, as well as increased labour market segmentation across the corporation and its 
subcontractors. 
Discussion 
 Industrial relations scholars have long argued that national institutions provide German 
unions with distinctive forms of bargaining leverage in negotiations over restructuring decisions. 
The causal relationship between national institutions and local bargaining outcomes is less 
transparent today, as union density and bargaining coverage decline and as employer strategies 
become increasingly varied at the firm- and establishment- level. One argument holds that strong 
representation rights and encompassing bargaining structures in Germany continue to provide 
workers with the tools to exercise some measure of industrial democracy lacking in the USA 
(Croucher and Singe, 2002; Katz and Darbishire, 2000). Other scholars argue that unions’ 
bargaining power has been substantially weakened as decentralization allows firms an ‘exit’ 
from expensive collective bargaining arrangements (Hassel, 1999; Menz, 2005). This article has 
contributed to this debate by shifting the focus away from macro-level trends in the scope and 
organization of bargaining, and exploring how unions actually use different institutions to build 
bargaining power and influence restructuring outcomes. 
 The case studies show that union success in engaging with management over outsourcing 
decisions differed within rather than between the USA and Germany. Unions in both countries 
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had uneven access to three resources identified in past studies of work restructuring: internal 
coordination, external coalitions and member mobilization. However, the relative importance of 
these resources to unions’ success differed between the countries. In the USA, the CWA relied 
on external coalitions backed up by member mobilization to compensate for weaker bargaining 
rights and more fragmented bargaining structures. Bargaining power was strongest at Verizon 
East because of favourable labour laws, high union density, a militant and well-organized 
membership base, relationships with local politicians and other unions and lobbying influence at 
state regulatory agencies. In Germany, ver.di relied on strong internal coordination, again 
supported by a well-organized membership base. The union enjoyed the greatest influence over 
outsourcing decisions in T-Com, where it was able to use its close relationships with works 
councils and its members to negotiate strong collective agreements and encourage alternative 
investment strategies.  
 These findings suggest that the distinctive features of national industrial relations 
institutions continue to play an important role in negotiations over restructuring, but are 
becoming less useful as static variables that explain company-level variation in restructuring 
outcomes. Worker representatives remain embedded in their respective political and economic 
environment and are still dependent on labour laws and bargaining arrangements to gain 
advantage at the bargaining table. However, in both the USA and Germany, decentralization has 
put unions under similar pressure to innovate, using old resources in new ways. This is by no 
means a new development – the meaning and use of industrial relations institutions have varied 
more considerably over time than their formal rules and structures. Jackson (2005), for example, 
has pointed out that German codetermination has gone through considerable changes as actors 
used relatively stable institutions in creative ways in response to new challenges. What does 
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seem to be new is the extent of variation in the outcomes of this process within social market 
countries like Germany, where unions were traditionally able to extend bargaining gains across 
firms in an industry. DT’s recent unilateral decision to move its call centre jobs to a separate 
subsidiary suggests that even established sources of bargaining leverage can be undermined by 
increasing cost-based pressures and shifting organizational strategies. 
 The generalizability of these findings may be limited by several factors. First, the 
telecommunications industry has a number of unique characteristics. In both the USA and 
Germany, it was long organized as a national monopoly that negotiated with one major union, 
and its market position continues to be heavily dependent on national and regional regulation. 
The CWA’s bargaining power is strengthened by its ability to leverage established relationships 
with regulatory agencies and politicians. Meanwhile, ver.di’s bargaining position has been 
substantially weakened by the rapid entry of non-union firms to the German telecommunications 
market and the lack of a sectoral agreement. A comparison with negotiations over outsourcing in 
other industries, such as car manufacturing, may reveal greater cross-national variation in 
outcomes. At the same time, it is striking that such large differences can be observed across the 
business units of DT, a single, large German employer, that are comparable to those found 
between the separate companies of the former Bell system in the USA.  
 By focusing on core employers, I have chosen cases where unions are most likely to 
enjoy institutionalized channels of influence. German unions may adopt similar strategies to US 
unions in new industries or firms, where they lack strong relationships with works councils or 
established positions on supervisory boards. At the same time, several recent studies have found 
that German unions have had broader difficulties implementing new strategies that rely on 
coalition-building or external forms of public pressure to organize new industries and groups of 
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workers (Aust and Holst, 2006; Baccaro et al., 2003). The lack of a tradition of more 
confrontational strategies, which developed in the USA under conditions of weak labour laws, 
may prove a greater obstacle to new organizing efforts.  
 Unions’ influence over management practices and working conditions increasingly 
depends on their ability to negotiate agreements that limit outsourcing. The findings from this 
study demonstrate that unions in both liberal and social market countries can gain an independent 
voice in these restructuring decisions through using traditional forms of bargaining power in 
innovative ways. However, they are unlikely to sustain their access to increasingly scarce 
resources and to shape the future production strategies of firms without considerable effort, 
creativity and organized political action. 
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Table 1. Characteristics of the US and German Cases (2003) 
 Market share Annual revenue Employees Call center 
employees 
Union density 
US firms 
   Verizon East 33% access lines 
(including Verizon 
West) 
$37.3 billion 
(including Verizon 
West) 
~80,000 ~11,000 ~70% 
   BellSouth 16% access lines $17.2 billion ~63,000 ~9750 ~75% 
   AT&T 29% long distance 
revenue 
$22.8 billion ~47,000 ~6600 ~40% 
German firms 
   T-Com 39% leased lines; 79% 
landline connections 
€25.3 billion ~140,000 31,000 ~70% 
   T-Mobile 39% subscribers €8.5 billion ~9000 2200 ~15% 
   T-Online ~50% subscribers €1.7 billion ~3000 650 ~5% 
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Table 2. Collective Agreements on Outsourcing and Outsourcing Strategies, USA (2004) 
 Collective agreements limiting outsourcing  Outsourcing strategies 
 Job security 
agreement 
Limits on 
moving jobs 
Agreement 
prohibiting 
outsourcing 
In-sourcing 
agreement 
 Customer 
service and 
sales 
Tele-
marketing 
Technical 
support 
Directory 
Enquiries 
Verizon East X X X X  None Partial Partial None 
BellSouth X  X X  None All All None 
AT&T X   X  Majority All All All 
 
  
NATIONAL INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS AND LOCAL BARGAINING POWER 36 
   
   
 
Table 3. Collective Agreements on Outsourcing and Outsourcing Strategies, Germany (2004) 
 Collective agreements limiting outsourcing  Outsourcing strategies 
 Layoff 
provisions 
Limits on 
moving jobs 
Informal 
agreement on 
outsourcing 
In-sourcing 
agreement 
 Customer 
service work 
Tele-
marketing 
Technical 
support 
Directory 
Enquiries 
T-Com X X X X  None Partial None Majority 
T-Mobile  X X   Partial Partial Partial N/A 
T-Online   X   Majority Majority Majority N/A 
 
